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A Brave New World for Latin America
Marcelo M. Giugale
Introduction and Summary
In 2009, Latin America dodged a bullet. Its efforts over the
previous decade at better economic management and smarter
social policy paid off, and the worst global recession in a gen-
eration caused only minor damage. Does this mean that the
re  gion will go back to business as usual, back to a commodity-
fueled bonanza, back to la vida loca? No, it doesn’t. The crisis
has opened challenges that our policy makers will be forced
to address, and opportunities they will be foolish to ignore. 
This report describes those challenges and opportunities,
and uses them to visualize how the region’s economic policy
agenda will change over the coming years. It does not focus
on all the issues that will be relevant, but on those that will
be relevant and different.1 Specifically, it will argue that six
new issues will appear on the radar of Latin American policy
makers: fiscal decision making that smoothes, rather than
exacerbates, business cycles; a profound preoccupation with
innovation as a means to commercial survival; adaptation to
a changing regulatory wisdom in finance; the shifting of so-
cial policy from equality to equity; the use of results to re-
build trust in the state; and the realities of having a bigger
role in world affairs. 
Not all Latin American countries will move along the
new agenda at the same speed. A few have already started,
and a few may even go for a while in an opposite direction.
Overall, however, the picture that emerges is one of second-
generation policies, a reflection of well-managed economies
making the most of a promising development horizon.
Independent Fiscal Agencies
The crisis has shown the wisdom of governments that save
in good times to spend more during downturns—the wis-
dom of “countercyclical fiscal policy.”2That simple principle
brought huge economic and political rewards to those that
practiced it (for example, Chile). But it did more than that.
It opened the door to a new way of thinking about public
With variations across countries, Latin America’s economic agenda will change over the next few years. Fiscal
policy will be monitored more independently, and may lean more against cycles. Financial regulation will be heavier,
and less attuned with a single international model. Innovation will be at the center of trade strategies. Equity will
begin to replace equality as the driver of social programs. More state agencies will be managed by results, starting
the long process of earning citizens’ trust. The region will play a larger global role, led by Brazil. And if the world’s
economy holds, most Latin Americans will be on a faster development path. finance. Much as in the early 1990s when worries about in-
flation led many Latin American countries to stop printing
money to pay for fiscal deficits and to shift control of the
printer to an independent central bank, worries about un-
employment may now lead them to link taxation and public
investment to growth. In the 1990s, half a dozen of our
countries adopted “inflation targets,” and met them. The
times for more independent fiscal decisions that take into
account “growth targets” cannot be too far away. 
Will independent fiscal agencies become common in
Latin America? Probably. But they will have advisory rather
than decision-making, roles. That is, they will be fiscal “coun-
cils” rather than fiscal “authorities.” In fact, a couple of coun-
cils already exist (Brazil, Chile), mostly in the form of
technical support for parliaments. As more countries in the
region implement “fiscal frameworks” or “fiscal responsibility
laws” (and 10 already have), independent monitoring will
become a necessity—both to judge the realism of budget
projections and to hold government’s accountable during
execution. To some extent, private organizations (for-profit
and not-for-profit) have been providing that kind of moni-
toring service for a while. As pressures mount for fiscal pol-
icy to be (and be perceived to be) countercyclical, the role
of fiscal watchdog will become institutionalized within the
apparatus of the state, but outside the control of incumbent
governments.
There may be an additional force pushing for independ-
ent fiscal opinions: the continuing accumulation of com-
modity-related revenues. In the baseline global scenario,
growth in Asia will keep commodity demand strong and
commodity prices high. Volumes may also increase, driven
by recent discoveries of oil and gas (Brazil, Colombia). This
will translate into fiscal abundance for many Latin American
countries. In that event, some of those monies will have to
be saved in sovereign wealth funds, whose rules of operation
will be the subject of much debate. Having independent
agencies monitor the application of those rules and, at times,
provide technical input (for example, in forecasting prices)
will become a more accepted practice—and a way to avoid
political meddling.
Innovate or Perish
Successful Latin American countries will have to learn to live
with appreciated currencies. With interest rates in the devel-
oped world likely to stay floor-low for a while, money will
continue to flow into the region’s more promising economies.
This will make them less competitive. There is not much
they can do about it—accumulate reserves, impose capital
controls and taxes, keep banks from credit sprees, increase
productive efficiency. But those are either unsustainable
measures or long-term reforms. The reality is that living in,
or exporting from, places like Bogotá, Lima, São Paulo, or
Santiago will be more expensive in U.S. dollars. It will be
more difficult to sell our products in the United States and
in any other country that keeps its currency tied to the U.S.
dollar (notably, China). That is why success in trade will now
depend more on new products. Although getting additional
free trade agreements will still be good, creating new brands
will be even better. 
The problem for Latin America is that, on the whole, it
has not excelled at innovation. It invests too little in research
and development, provides few tax incentives, does not pro-
tect intellectual property well, and has universities that are
disconnected from its businesses. This is reflected in minute
levels of patent registration, declining total factor produc-
tivity (relative to the U.S. benchmark), few firms acquiring
quality certifications (less than a quarter), and a commercial
penetration that has been stagnant for decades (only about
5 percent of world trade has a Latin American as partner)
(figure 1). Even the precrisis years of abundant financing
saw only a handful of new Latin American business lines
come to market—premium foods, medical tourism, aero-
nautic engineering, software development, and call centers. 
It will take years to fix those problems, but the new global
reality will make change unavoidable. Will there be a single
formula to foster innovation in Latin America? No. Our
countries differ in terms of technological stock, efficacy of
tax systems, quality of human capital, legal predictability,
and institutional capacity. But successful innovation strate-
gies show some common features that point the way for-
ward: they are priorities of the state (they do not change
from government to government); they are not based solely
on markets; all relevant stakeholders are engaged (big and
small, public and private); somebody is accountable for re-
sults; they are part of a broader effort of integration; they
are well funded; they are continuously evaluated and ad-
justed; they begin with quick wins (usually in the area of
quality standards); they include reforms in tertiary educa-
tion; and they operate within a reliable legal framework.
It is interesting to note that more private innovation in
Latin America will call for better public action. From ven-
ture funding to skill improvement, the state will have a new
role to play. Rather than taking the exclusive leadership as
it tried in the past (with poor results), it will become a cat-
alyzing partner in multiagent efforts. In some cases, it will
contribute resources; in others, it will contribute reforms.
Reinventing Finance
We will be wary of fancy finance. Our banks and bourses
sailed through the crisis rather well. There were no subprime
surprises in Latin America. In part, that is because our finan-
cial sectors are small, unsophisticated, and with limited ex-






















































Figure 1. Symptoms of Innovation, or Lack of It
Source: World Bank staff calculations and projections, based on
International Monetary Fund (World Economic Outlook) data
Note: Commercial penetration is defined as exports plus imports as a









































Source: World Bank staff calculations and projections, based on Heston,
Summers, and Aten (2006).
Note: The chart shows the output per worker as a ratio of the U.S. output
per worker over time. The Latin America aggregate is calculated as the
unweighted average of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and República Bolivariana de Venezuela.
The Asia aggregate is calculated as the unweighted average of China; Hong
Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Singapore;
Taiwan, China); and Thailand. 
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Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on World Intellectual Property
Organization and World Bank data.
Note: R&D = research and development. The chart shows the number of










































Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on World Bank data.
Note: The chart shows the relationship between R&D expenditure as a
percentage of GDP and the GDP per capita. 
d. R&D expenditure













ternal connections; and, in part, because we still regulate
them in a heavy-handed, old-fashioned way. On top, our re-
maining publicly owned banks came in handy to keep credit
flowing. Meanwhile, the developed world, shocked by the
excesses on Wall Street, entered a wide debate about new
ways to control financiers without killing their creativity.
From how much capital banks should hold to how much
bankers should be paid, and from who is “too big to fail” to
how savers should be protected, it is all up for discussion.
Over the next couple of years, governments in our region
will have to decide how much of the new thinking to adopt,
adapt or avoid.
In practice, regional policy makers will be dealing with fi-
nancial issues at both ends of the technical spectrum. On the
one hand, postcrisis second-generation questions will have to
be addressed—countercyclical regulation, systemic risk, and
nonbank intermediaries. On the other hand, a long list of
basic but critical matters that preceded the crisis remainspending, especially in terms of competition and efficiency,
access by the poor, and underdeveloped equity markets.
That policy dichotomy will play out at a time when Latin
America’s financial sector will be under pressure. In the
short-term, and as described earlier, foreign capital inflows
will be abundant. Much of these inflows will be reflected in
excess liquidity among domestic banks and in larger domes-
tic lending. Some will flow into the regional equity markets,
which (given their relatively small size) may quickly expe-
rience a surge in prices. In both cases, the domestic financial
sector will be exposed to sudden capital flow reversal. Reg-
ulating this risk away will not be easy.
A different challenge emerges in the medium term. The
region’s largest countries are expected to continue experi-
encing surpluses in their balance of payments’ current ac-
counts, led by high commodity prices. The counterpart of
those surpluses—large domestic savings—will need to be in-
termediated. In other words, the balance sheet of Latin
America’s  financial  system  will  expand  considerably.
Whether this fosters consumption or investment, at home
or abroad, by the public or by the private sector, will depend
on the regulatory parameters under which the system is
made to operate. In the recent past, markets could be relied
on to set some of those parameters (for example, through
credit ratings); de facto, the crisis has shifted that responsi-
bility almost entirely back to governments.
Equity , More than Equality
We have learned the value of knowing the poor by name.
An estimated 8 million Latino-Americans fell into poverty
in 2009, and about 5 million missed their chance to leave
poverty behind. Those are sad numbers; but, compared with
past experience, they are very small. What sheltered us? We
avoided jumps in inflation, so people’s purchasing power did
not melt. But more remarkably, for the first time we had ef-
fective mechanisms to protect the poor. Thirteen of our
countries had spent the previous decade identifying the poor
one by one, and setting up channels to transfer cash directly
to them—not an easy task when you think that the poor
rarely have bank accounts or even postal addresses.3This has
provided a platform for the next big move in Latin Ameri-
can social policy: to focus on equality of opportunity, on giv-
ing  everybody  the  same  chances  rather  than  the  same
rewards, on equity rather than equality. 
Latin America remains the most unequal region on earth.
Inequality  dominates  virtually  all  its  development  out-
comes—income, educational achievement, landownership.
Taxation and public expenditures have made little difference
in addressing the problem (figure 2).
The result has been acrimonious political disagreement
over the proper role of the state: should it redistribute wealth
or protect private property? This has weakened confidence
in the region’s legal security, to the detriment of long-term
investment. There is no disagreement, however, over the
need to give all Latin Americans the same opportunities, as
a matter of social justice or as a call to personal effort. Equity
enjoys support across the political spectrum. The problem
was that we had never been able to systematically measure
inequality of opportunity, in Latin America or anywhere
else. The development profession simply lacked the method-
ological tools to monitor equity, making it all but impossible
to design, implement, and evaluate public policies that target
human opportunity.
That changed in 2008. A new technology to measure in-
equality of opportunity—the Human Opportunity Index
(HOI)—became available, the creation of a team of Latin
American researchers. In essence, the HOI calculates how
personal circumstances (like gender, skill-color, or family in-
come) affect the probability a child has of accessing the serv-
ices  that  are  necessary  to  succeed  in  life  (like  timely
education, basic health care, or connection to electricity).
Figure 3 shows the 2010 HOI for Latin America. 
The HOI, combined with the data and logistics embed-
ded in the direct cash transfer programs that Latin America
now has, will make it possible to redirect its social policy to-
ward equity (where there is consensus) and away from equal-
ity (where there is not). How? Many existing social policies
and programs are already equity enhancing. But focus on 
equity reveals new points of emphasis along the individual’s

























Source: World Bank staff calculations, based on World Bank and OECD data.
Note: EU = European Union; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-opera-

















Figure 2. Gini Coefficients before and after Public Transfers, 
circa 2006
before afterlife cycle. Early interventions, from pregnancy monitoring
and institutional births to toddlers’ nutrition and neurolog-
ical development, get a new sense of priority. So do pre-
school access (such as prekindergarten social interaction)
and primary-school achievement (such as reading standards
and critical thinking). The physical security, reproductive ed-
ucation, mentoring, and talent screening in adolescents—all
areas that are often overlooked—gain new relevance. A bat-
tery of legal and institutional preconditions becomes essen-
tial: from birth certificates, voter registration, and property
titles; to the enforcement of antidiscrimination, antitrust,
and access-to-information laws. And blanket subsidies that,
at the margin, are consumed by those who do not need them
(free public college education for the rich, to name one) turn
into opportunity-wasting aberrations. If nothing else, the
quest for equity will lead to a final push in the decade-long
process of subsidy focalization, and will spell the end for a
way of giving out public assistance that was blind to the
needs of the recipient (a way that was intrinsically unfair).
T rust the State
From now on, we will demand a lot more of the state—to
spend more, to regulate more, to protect more. Trust in free
markets has been damaged. But Latino-Americans never 
really trusted the state either. That is why they refuse to fund
it, and remain trapped in a vicious circle of tax evasion and
deficient public services. Even progress in fighting corrup-
tion (which, unheralded, has occurred) has not done much
to rebuild the relationship between our state and our people
(figure 4).
That will need to change soon. Technology and politics
will help. New ways to hold public institutions accountable
have been penetrating the region for a while, initially among
municipalities and provinces where mayors and governors
face voters more closely. We now have standards to measure
the quality of education, infrastructure, security, and any
other public service. How many words per minute should a
second-grader read? At least 60. How much should the cost
of logistics be for every dollar exported? No more than 10
cents. What should be the “normal” annual homicide rate?
Three for every 100,000 people. The list goes on. Few serv-
ices in few of our countries are, of course, up to par. But po-
litical leaders who have committed publicly to this kind of
results do very well in the polls (for example, in Brazil). Oth-
ers will surely follow. The average Latin American state will
be increasingly managed and judged by the results it achieves.
There will be another force pushing the state toward results-
based management—devolution. Ushered in by the return
of democracy in the 1980s, Latin America entered a rapid
process of decentralization in the mid-1990s. Tax and ex-
penditure responsibilities were delegated to provinces and
municipalities. The quality of public services did not always
improve. But decentralization proved popular and is bound
to deepen. At the same time, the new ways to do social as-
sistance described earlier showed the possibilities opened by
the state’s ability to communicate with, and transfer re-
sources to, individual citizens. On a simple magnetic card or
even a cell phone, the state can transfer directly to the ben-
eficiary the funds to buy or the right to access almost any
service, from vaccination to college education. There is no
longer a need for intermediaries. Decentralization will be
gradually moving down to the citizen’s level; in a way, it will
become “devolution.” This new, direct relationship between



































Source: World Bank 2010 Human Opportunity Report.
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parliamentpeople and the state is generating, and will continue to gen-
erate, a wealth of information—about costs, quality, target-
ing, needs, outcomes, impacts. Monitoring and evaluation of
policies and programs will be much easier. And management
by results will become natural. 
A Global Player
The 2009 crisis created new forms of external support and
integration for Latin America. Our multilateral lenders were
promised larger lending capacity and more fair representa-
tion. Flexible financing for good performers was quickly of-
fered. The G-20 brought Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico to
the table where the decisions that will shape the world will
be made. In the redesign of financial regulation, the next
round of trade negotiation, or the efforts to slow climate
change, Latin Americans now have a better opportunity to
be heard. They will also count in the rebalancing of the
global matrix of saving and consumption; after all, their con-
sumption is larger than China’s in absolute dollar terms and
as a proportion of GDP. The region is even seeing the emer-
gence of its first, own global leader—Brazil. 
But our contribution to global commons will go farther.
A new generation of former national leaders left, or will soon
leave, office in success and popularity (in Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Uruguay, to name a few). Play-
ing by market rules but listening to their people’s needs, they
delivered prosperity and social progress for their countries.
Their governments have not only done well using traditional
policy tools, but have also pioneered new ones (such as struc-
tural fiscal balances and conditional cash transfers). They are
now credible spokespeople for good administration, and are
much sought after in the international conference circuit.
They have become global assets who will give the region a
new voice.
This new relevance will bring new disciplines, and will re-
inforce others. It will be more difficult for Latin American
countries to backtrack in trade and financial openness, and
more painful to lose investment grades. Worldwide rankings
will have larger domestic impact (call it the “embarrassment
factor”), from those dealing with public transparency to
those dealing with the quality of the business environment.
And light may begin to shine on long-postponed reforms,
without which the benefits of integration are diluted—no-
tably, in education and infrastructure. 
Conclusion: If the World Holds, 
Latin America Will Take Off
The alignment of domestic and external factors augurs well
for Latin America’s future. Macroeconomic and financial
discipline, combined with smarter social policy and a more
responsive public sector, may not yet be universal values in
the region; but an increasing number of countries are adopt-
ing them as part of their development strategies. Our voters
begin to reward sensible policy making. At the same time,
the rapid growth of the middle classes in Asia should ensure
high, long-term prices for what Latin America sells. If well
managed, this “commodity platform” could be the stepping-
stone for the region to upgrade its productive capacity (es-
pecially its human capital) and expand its brand beyond
natural resources.
Are there downside risks? Yes, many. Most come from the
global economy. The recovery could be a slow, protracted
process, dragged down by balance-sheet adjustments (for ex-
ample, in mortgage markets) or second-round effects (such
as persistent unemployment). Commodity prices may dive
if the liquidity injected by the G-7 during the crisis is rolled
back too quickly, or if China’s domestic consumption does
not compensate for the return of its public investment to
prestimulus levels. Massive fiscal imbalances in the United
States will not be easy to correct, hinting at much higher in-
terest rates (and/or dollar inflation) in the near future. A
downgrade of sovereign debt among developed countries
could trigger a flight to safety and away from emerging mar-
kets. And there are plenty of uncertainties at home: specific
countries could still run into overheating and high inflation,
breakdowns in internal security, or political turbulence. 
Any of those risks could derail Latin America’s growth,
at least for a while. But for the first time in decades, its fun-
damentals look solid and the horizon promising. In the base
external scenario, and with variations across countries, the
region as a whole is converging on a path of sustained de-
velopment.
Notes
1. The views presented in this report are the author’s
own, and do not necessarily represent those of the World
Bank Group or of its board of executive directors.
2. At the margin, the crisis also showed the wisdom of
building agile public investment systems. Several countries
(Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru) quickly embarked on strength-
ening those systems.
3.The process of identifying the poor forced a parallel
process of integration of individual social records across min-
istries and agencies; this should further facilitate tailoring so-
cial programs to individual needs.
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